Mind 123 (489):157-174 (2014)

Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
Salvatore Florio
University of Birmingham
In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front.
Keywords set theory  type theory  unrestricted quantification  plural quantification
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzu039
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References found in this work BETA

The Seas of Language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
All Things Indefinitely Extensible.Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), ¸ Iterayo&Uzquiano:Ag. Clarendon Press. pp. 255--304.

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Citations of this work BETA

Plural Quantification.Ø Linnebo - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Unrestricted Quantification.Salvatore Florio - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):441-454.

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