When to Psychologize

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):968-982 (2023)
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The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we are in a position to know that they are in bad faith.

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A. K. Flowerree
Texas Tech University

Citations of this work

Moral Grandstanding and Norms of Moral Discourse.A. K. Flowerree & Mark Satta - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-28.

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References found in this work

Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Varieties of Moral Encroachment.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26.

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