Freedom of Choice and Expected Compromise

Social Choice and Welfare 35 (1):65-79 (2010)
Abstract
This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.
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Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?Martin Peterson - 2011 - Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):411-424.

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