A modal argument for narrow content

Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26 (1991)
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Keywords Identity  Metaphysics  Property  Realism  Supervenience
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DOI 10.2307/2027084
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Cause and Essence.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Synthese 93 (3):403 - 449.
Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.
Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
Two Tales of Functional Explanation.Martin Roth & Robert Cummins - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):773-788.

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