A Reply to Brian Loar's "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?"

It is argued that Loar's paper overestimates the importance of the distinction between 'functionalist' and 'representationalist' theories of the propositional attitudes; specifically, that the only version of functionalism which appears likely to provide an adequate account of the attitudes is one which treats them as relations to mental representations. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some of Loar's objection to 'ideal indicator' theories of the relation between beliefs and their truth conditions. It is argued that these objections are not decisive.
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Gilbert Harman (1982). Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Brian Loar, "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:654 - 661.
Brian Loar (1982). Must Beliefs Be Sentences? Philosophy of Science Association 1982:627 - 643.
Brian Loar (1982). Reply to Fodor and Harman. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:662 - 666.
Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.

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