MIT Press (1990)
Abstract |
Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction PART I Intentionality Chapter 1 Fodor’ Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie’s Vade-Mecum Chapter 2 Semantics, Wisconsin Style Chapter 3 A Theory of Content, I: The Problem Chapter 4 A Theory of Content, II: The Theory Chapter 5 Making Mind Matter More Chapter 6 Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs Chapter 7 Stephen Schiffer’s Dark Night of The Soul: A Review of Remnants of Meaning PART II Modularity Chapter 8 Précis of The Modularity of Mind Chapter 9 Why Should the Mind Be Modular? Chapter 10 Observation Reconsidered Appendix: A Reply to Churchland’s ‘Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" References Index of Names.
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Keywords | Epistemology Holism Intentionality Meaning Metaphysics Mind Representation Semantics Dretske, F Fodor, J |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 1992 |
Buy this book | $32.70 new (7% off) $35.00 from Amazon Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 0262560690 0262061309 9780262560696 |
DOI | 10.2307/2219687 |
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
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