Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118 (1982)
Abstract
"Twin earth" examples have motivated a number of proposals for the lexicography of kind terms in natural languages. It is argued that these proposals create unacceptable difficulties for the analysis of de dicto propositional attitudes. A conservative solution of the twin earth problems is then proposed according to which they reflect pragmatic features of language use rather than semantic features of lexical contentDOI
10.1305/ndjfl/1093883623
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Citations of this work
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.
Meaning making and the mind of the externalist.Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 167--188.
