Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42 (1985)
The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book
|Keywords||Cartesianism cognition faculty psychology interactionism language modularity neuropsychology perception phrenology|
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References found in this work BETA
The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.Karl R. Popper & John C. Eccles - 1977 - Springer.
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
The Comparative Psychology of Intelligence.Euan M. Macphail - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):645.
Adaptability of Innate Motor Patterns and Motor Control Mechanisms.M. B. Berkinblit, A. G. Feldman & O. I. Fukson - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):585.
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