David Lewis on indicative and counterfactual conditionals

Analysis 58 (4):286–289 (1998)
Abstract
David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else was. If Oswald had not been the one who shot Kennedy, then someone else would have been
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00133
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The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model.Xavier De Donato-Rodríguez & Alfonso Arroyo-Santos - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):11-27.
The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model. [REVIEW]Xavier Donato Rodríguez & Alfonso Arroyo Santos - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):11-27.

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