Synthese 103 (2):141--52 (1995)

Authors
Janet Folina
Macalester College
Abstract
There are several distinct components of the realist anti-realist debate. Since each side in the debate has its disadvantages, it is tempting to try to combine realist theses with anti-realist theses in order to obtain a better, more moderate position. Putnam attempts to hold a realist concept of truth, yet he rejects realist metaphysics and realist semantics. He calls this view internal realism. Truth is realist on this picture for it is objective, rather than merely intersubjective, and eternal. Putnam introduces a concept of epistemic idealization — epistemically ideal conditions, or idealized justification — to try to ground the strong objectivity of truth without sliding into metaphysical realism. I argue that the concept of ideal conditions to which Putnam appeals does not cohere with his (anti-realist) commitment to an assertability conditions account of meaning.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01090045
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References found in this work BETA

Realism with a Human Face.Hilary Putnam - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
Putnam, Quine - and the Facts.Burton Dreben - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):293-315.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sobre Kant, Putnam y el realismo interno.Luisa Posada - 2012 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 29 (1):173-187.

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