Oxford University Press (2001)

Abstract
Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human.
Keywords Ethics
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Reprint years 2003
Call number BJ1012.F56 2001
ISBN(s) 019926547X   0198235089   9780198235088   9780199265473
DOI 10.1093/mind/112.445.130
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Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Happiness is From the Soul: The Nature and Origins of Our Happiness Concept.Fan Yang - forthcoming - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse & Glen Pettigrove - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Virtue in Argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):165-179.

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