Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):699-717 (2018)

Authors
Luke Semrau
Georgetown University
Andrew T. Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Abstract
A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
A Reason to Know.Olof Leffler - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
Reasons Internalism, Cooperation, and Law.Olof Leffler - 2020 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: pp. 115-132.

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