Confirmation and explaining how possible

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that formal inquiry can provide a kind of confirmation-theoretic support for evolutionary models, and offer an example of how-possibly explanation interacting with testing practice

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,515

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):302-310.
Organisms as natural purposes: The contemporary evolutionary perspective.D. M. Walsh - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (4):771-791.
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?Philippe Verreault-Julien - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:1-12.
The Confirmation of Mathematics and its Relationship to Science.Anthony Francis Peressini - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Visual Representations and Confirmation.Laura Perini - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):913-926.
Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation.Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:87-96.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-12

Downloads
117 (#161,396)

6 months
14 (#356,052)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Forber
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Understanding (with) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1069-1099.
Understanding (With) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx005.
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?Philippe Verreault-Julien - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:1-12.
Models and Explanation.Alisa Bokulich - 2017 - In Magnani Lorenzo & Bertolotti Tommaso Wayne (eds.), Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science. Springer. pp. 103-118.

View all 51 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The origin of species.Charles Darwin - 1859 - New York: Norton. Edited by Philip Appleman.
Scientific explanation.James Woodward - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1):41-67.
Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.

View all 31 references / Add more references