Confirmation and explaining how possible

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that formal inquiry can provide a kind of confirmation-theoretic support for evolutionary models, and offer an example of how-possibly explanation interacting with testing practice.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,310

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Confirmation and explaining how possible.Patrick Forber - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40.
How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber.Thomas A. C. Reydon - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):302-310.
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?Philippe Verreault-Julien - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:1-12.
Organisms as natural purposes: The contemporary evolutionary perspective.D. M. Walsh - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (4):771-791.
The Confirmation of Mathematics and its Relationship to Science.Anthony Francis Peressini - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
Visual Representations and Confirmation.Laura Perini - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):913-926.
How to Explain How-Possibly.Lindsay Brainard - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (13):1-23.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-20

Downloads
36 (#497,293)

6 months
8 (#817,301)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Forber
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Understanding (with) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1069-1099.
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?Philippe Verreault-Julien - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:1-12.
Models and Explanation.Alisa Bokulich - 2017 - In Magnani Lorenzo & Bertolotti Tommaso Wayne (eds.), Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science. Springer. pp. 103-118.
Understanding with theoretical models.Petri Ylikoski & N. Emrah Aydinonat - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (1):19-36.

View all 47 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references