Wayne Myrvold (2003) has captured an important feature of unified theories, and he has done so in Bayesian terms. What is not clear is whether the virtue of such unification is most clearly understood in terms of Bayesian confirmation. I argue that the virtue of such unification is better understood in terms of other truth-related virtues such as predictive accuracy.
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