Forever beyond our grasp?

Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):135-141 (2008)
Does science successfully uncover the deep structure of the natural world? Or are the depths forever beyond our epistemic grasp? Since the decline of logical positivism and logical empiricism, scientific realism has become the consensus view: of course our scientific theories apprehend the deep structure of the world. What else could explain the remarkable success of science? This is the explanationist defense of scientific realism, the “ultimate argument.” Kyle Stanford starts here and, using the history of theorizing about biological inheritance as his case study, constructs a convincing argument against the realist consensus in his thought provoking book, Exceeding Our Grasp.1 Here I will review the core of Stanford’s new argument for instrumentalism (§ 1) and discuss his considered view of theoretical science (§ 2).
Keywords Philosophy   Evolutionary Biology   Philosophy of Biology
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/s10539-007-9074-x
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References found in this work BETA
The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.

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Citations of this work BETA
Global and Local Pessimistic Meta-Inductions.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):409-428.
Reconceiving Eliminative Inference.Patrick Forber - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (2):185-208.
Defending the Selective Confirmation Strategy.Yukinori Onishi - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64:1-10.

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