Frege's objection to the ontological argument

Noûs 6 (3):251-265 (1972)

Abstract
Frege argued that 1) in making existence assertions we ascribe (or deny) the second-Level property, 'not being empty', To a first-Level concept. He inferred from this that 2) existence is a second-Level property, The property 'not being empty'. He therefore rejected the ontological proof of the existence of God because, He claimed, It depends on the assumption that existence is a first-Level, And not a second-Level, Property. In this paper it is argued, First, That frege is unsuccessful in his attempt to establish claim 1). Moreover, Claim 2) does not follow from claim 1)--One could accept claim 1) and still maintain that existence is a first-Level property. Thus, Even if the ontological proof does depend on the assumption that existence is a first-Level property, Frege's objection to that proof fails
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2214773
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,545
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How is the Question 'is Existence a Predicate?' Relevant to the Ontological Argument?J. William Forgie - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (3):117 - 133.
How is the Question ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’ Relevant to the Ontological Argument?J. William Forgie - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (3):117-133.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
51 ( #144,632 of 2,325,377 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #922,770 of 2,325,377 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature