Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72 (2011)

Abstract
William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions of semantics and syntax, but he does not translate Searle’s Chinese Room argument into that idiom before attacking it. Once the Chinese Room is translated into Rapaport’s idiom (in a manner that preserves the distinction between meaningful representations and uninterpreted symbols), I demonstrate how Rapaport’s argument fails to defeat the CRA. This failure brings a crucial element of the Chinese Room Argument to the fore: the person in the Chinese Room is prevented from connecting the Chinese symbols to his/her own meaningful experiences and memories. This issue must be addressed before any victory over the CRA is announced
Keywords Chinese room argument  Searle  Helen Keller  Computationalism  Meaning  Experience  Rapaport
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9220-0
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains and Science.John R. Searle - 1984 - Harvard University Press.
The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.
The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-207.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Chinese Room Argument.David Cole - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do Computers "Have Syntax, But No Semantics"?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):305-321.

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