International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194 (2017)
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.”
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References found in this work
Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference.Andrew Brook - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 9--30.
The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason.José Luis Bermúdez - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
Apperception and Spontaneity.Wolfgang Carl - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):147 – 163.
Kant and the Self: A Retrospective.Karl Ameriks - 1997 - In David Klemm and Zöller (ed.), Figuring the Self. Suny Press. pp. 55--72.
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