Newman's Reasonable Approach to Faith

Newman Studies Journal 8 (1):56-66 (2011)
Abstract
Newman sought a via media—a middle ground—between “evidentialists,” who considered reason supreme and so disparaged faith, and “existentialists,” who wanted to create a fortress of faith impenetrable to reason. Examining the way people actually think, Newman identified three types of inference that lead people to make decisions. This inferential process, which is operative in the decisions of every day life, serves as a paradigm for understanding how the human mind—particularly the illative sense—operates in religious matters; accordingly, Newman presents faith as a personal and reasonable inference
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Major Philosophers  Philosophy and Religion  Religious Studies
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1547-9080
DOI 10.5840/nsj2011816
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,798
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John Henry Newman and Luigi Giussani.Matthew Briel - 2009 - Newman Studies Journal 6 (1):57-67.
The Cognitive Basis of Faith.Avery Dulles - 1997 - Philosophy and Theology 10 (1):19-31.
Newman.Marty Miller Maddox - 2007 - Newman Studies Journal 4 (1):69-86.
John Henry Newman as Contextual Theologian.John T. Ford - 2005 - Newman Studies Journal 2 (2):60-76.
John Henry Newman on Ecclesial Spiritual Life.Kevin Mongrain - 2008 - Newman Studies Journal 5 (1):19-34.
Added to PP index
2012-03-18

Total downloads
12 ( #389,602 of 2,199,759 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #300,203 of 2,199,759 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature