Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):46-56 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Agent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, however, that the commitments of agent-relative consequentialism lead it to run afoul of a plausibility requirement on moral theories. A moral theory must not be such that, in any possible circumstance, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more reason to prefer the world thereby actualized over the world that would have been actualized if every agent had instead acted permissibly.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,213

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Different Perspectives on Cross-Compliance.Stefan Mann - 2005 - Environmental Values 14 (4):471 - 482.
From Compliance to Concordance in Diabetes.J. S. Chatterjee - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (9):507-510.
Disassociation Intuitions.Bob Fischer & Isaac Wiegman - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):85-92.
The Immorality of Prayer.Ardon Lyon - 2015 - Think 14 (40):57-64.
What is Wrong with Compliance?S. Holm - 1993 - Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (2):108-110.
Non-Compliance: A Side Effect of Drug Information Leaflets.F. Verdu - 2004 - Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (6):608-609.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-22

Downloads
51 (#227,859)

6 months
6 (#123,139)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Luke Semrau
Georgetown University
Andrew T. Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Citations of this work

Relativized Rankings.Matthew Hammerton - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 46-66.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.

View all 44 references / Add more references