Predictive Accuracy as an Achievable Goal of Science

Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S124-S134 (2002)
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Abstract

What has science actually achieved? A theory of achievement should define what has been achieved, describe the means or methods used in science, and explain how such methods lead to such achievements. Predictive accuracy is one truth-related achievement of science, and there is an explanation of why common scientific practices tend to increase predictive accuracy. Akaike's explanation for the success of AIC is limited to interpolative predictive accuracy. But therein lies the strength of the general framework, for it also provides a clear formulation of many open problems of research.

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Malcolm Forster
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.
A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success.Malcolm R. Forster - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
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The role of Bayesian philosophy within Bayesian model selection.Jan Sprenger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.

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The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.
Instrumentalism, parsimony, and the akaike framework.Elliott Sober - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S112-S123.

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