Peirce and semiotic foundationalism


Authors
Michael Forest
Canisius College
Abstract
: This paper articulates a view of the relation between cognition and being in Peirce's thought, especially derived from his early papers of 1868–69. Based on the rejection of intuitions, I argue that Peirce realized an isomorphic relation between cognition and being that functions as a semiotic foundation. I consider several challenges to these notions in the literature, including doubts about pansemioticism, foundationalism, and realism. In the end, I suggest that the semiotic foundation be thought of as a kind of transcendental, in several senses of that term
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DOI 10.1353/csp.2007.0058
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