Physicalism, instrumentalism and the semantics of modal logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (3):271 - 298 (1983)
Abstract
The delicate point in the formalistic position is to explain how the non-intuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real meaning in terms of which they are true (S. C. Kleene, 1952)
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DOI 10.1007/BF00263479
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References found in this work BETA
Actualism and Thisness.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):3-41.
ModelTtheory for Modal Logic. Part I — The de Re/de Dicto Distinction.Kit Fine - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):125 - 156.
From Worlds to Possibilities.I. L. Humberstone - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):313 - 339.
Necessity and Truth Theories.Christopher Peacocke - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):473 - 500.

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Citations of this work BETA
Predicate Metric Tense Logic for 'Now' and 'Then'.M. J. Cresswell - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):1-24.
Temporal Reference in Linear Tense Logic.M. J. Cresswell - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):173-200.
Thisness and Vagueness.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
Two Solutions to Chisholm's Paradox.Graeme Forbes - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (2):171 - 187.

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