Utilitas 21 (3):337-346 (2009)

Authors
Scott Forschler
University of Minnesota
Abstract
Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the arguments of Eric Wiland and Frances Howard-Snyder against objective consequentialism, two of Railton's arguments which might seem to count against the second form of subjective consequentialism are shown to be ineffective. This leaves subjective consequentialism as a viable theory to replace objective consequentialism with.
Keywords objective consequentialism  subjective consequentialism  truth conditions for ethical claims  acceptance conditions for ethical claims  Peter Railton
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0953820809990082
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,185
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-08-23

Total views
177 ( #60,681 of 2,455,132 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #84,221 of 2,455,132 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes