Truth and acceptance conditions for moral statements can be identical: Further support for subjective consequentialism

Utilitas 21 (3):337-346 (2009)
Abstract
Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the arguments of Eric Wiland and Frances Howard-Snyder against objective consequentialism, two of Railton's arguments which might seem to count against the second form of subjective consequentialism are shown to be ineffective. This leaves subjective consequentialism as a viable theory to replace objective consequentialism with.
Keywords objective consequentialism  subjective consequentialism  truth conditions for ethical claims  acceptance conditions for ethical claims  Peter Railton
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820809990082
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