The Arithmetic of Intention

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):129-143 (2015)

Anton Ford
University of Chicago
Anscombe holds that a proper account of intentional action must exhibit “a ‘form’ of description of events.” But what does that mean? To answer this question, I compare the method of Anscombe’s Intention with that of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic—another classic work of analytic philosophy that consciously opposes itself to psychological explanations. On the one hand, positively, I aim to identify and elucidate the kind of account of intentional action that Anscombe attempts to provide. On the other hand, negatively, I hope to dispel the canard that Anscombe’s opposition to the causal theory of action is a product of “behaviorism.”
Keywords action  action theory  Anscombe  Frege  intention  reasons
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The Problem of Action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):157-162.
Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism.Stina Bäckström & Martin Gustafsson - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
The Representation of Action.Anton Ford - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:217-233.

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