Theoretical explanation in physical science

Erkenntnis 23 (3):269 - 294 (1985)
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Abstract

An account of physical explanation derived from the instance view of scientific explanation is outlined, and it is shown that this account does not cover explanations by theories which contain theoretical functions. An alternative account, also derived from the instance view, is proposed on the basis of Sneed's account of theories. It is shown that this account does cover theoretical explanations. Finally, it is shown that this account can accommodate explananda that record errors of measurement.

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John Forge
University College, London (Alumnus)

Citations of this work

The instance theory of explanation.John Forge - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):127 – 142.
Theoretical functions, theory and evidence.John Forge - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (3):443-463.
Theoretical functions in physical science.John Forge - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (1):1 - 29.

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