Theoretical explanation in physical science

Erkenntnis 23 (3):269 - 294 (1985)
An account of physical explanation derived from the instance view of scientific explanation is outlined, and it is shown that this account does not cover explanations by theories which contain theoretical functions. An alternative account, also derived from the instance view, is proposed on the basis of Sneed's account of theories. It is shown that this account does cover theoretical explanations. Finally, it is shown that this account can accommodate explananda that record errors of measurement.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00168294
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References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Forge (1986). The Instance Theory of Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):127 – 142.

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