The problem of factives for sense theories

Analysis 71 (4):654-662 (2011)
This paper discusses some recent responses to Kripke’s modal objections to descriptivism about names. One response, due to Gluer-Pagin and Pagin, involves employing "actually" operators in a new way. Another, developed mainly by Chalmers, involves distinguishing the dimension of meaning modal operators affect from the dimension other operators, especially epistemic ones, affect. I argue that both these moves run into problems with "mixed" contexts involving factive verbs such as "know", "establish", "prove", etc. In mixed contexts there are both modal and epistemic operators, and it seems that some contradictory examples, such as "possibly (Hesperus has a moon and someone establishes that Hesperus has no moon)", are classified as true according to these views
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr089
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
The Indispensability of Sinn.Graeme Forbes - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
Proper Names and Relational Modality.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism.Josh Dever - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (1):1-16.
Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In.Graeme Forbes - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reply to Forbes.K. Gluer & P. Pagin - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):298-303.
The A Priori‐Operator and the Nesting Problem.Eric Johannesson & Sara Packalén - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):169-176.

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