The problem of evil: Two neglected defences [Book Review]

Sophia 20 (1):49-54 (1981)
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Abstract

Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence.A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of Evil

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Citations of this work

Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.Klaas J. Kraay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368.
The problem of evil.Michael Tooley - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Evil and the many universes response.Jason Megill - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):127-138.
The Multiverse and Divine Creation.Mike Almeida - 2017 - Religions 8 (12):1 - 10.

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References found in this work

Divine perfection.Julian Wolfe - 1975 - Sophia 14 (3):40-41.

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