A rule of minimal rationality: The logical link between beliefs and values

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):341 – 353 (1976)
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Abstract

The object of this essay is to demonstrate a logical connection between beliefs and values. It is argued that such a connection can be established only if one keeps in mind the question: What is minimally required in order that it makes sense to speak of beliefs and values at all? Thus, the concept of minimal rationality is indispensable to the task at hand. A particular example of a logical connection between a belief and a value is examined, which leads to a formal rule (Rule of Minimal Rationality) which expresses in general the logical connection between beliefs and values. This rule is elaborated to include attempted activities as well as activities simpliciter, activities having been discovered as essential to any logical connection between beliefs and values. Finally, some interesting implications and promising applications of the Rule of Minimal Rationality are outlined

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On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1963 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Practical reasoning.David P. Gauthier - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Good and evil: a new direction.Richard Taylor - 1970 - [New York]: Macmillan.

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