Abstract
In Consciousness Explained, Dennett elaborates and defends a materialist?functionalist account of the human mind, and of consciousness in particular. This defence depends crucially on his prior rejection of dualism. Dennett rejects this dualist alternative on three grounds: first, that its version of mind?to?body causation is in conflict with what we know, or have good reason to believe, from the findings of physical science; second, that the very notion of dualistic psychophysical causation is incoherent; and third, that dualism puts the mind beyond the reach of scientific investigation. In each case, his reasoning is unconvincing, and indeed leaves the dualist entirely unscathed. In contrast, without an adequate basis for his rejection of dualism, Dennett himself is left with a theory which is vulnerable to a number of familiar objections
Keywords Consciousness  Dualism  Epistemology  Mind  Science  Dennett, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201749308602309
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,740
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Experience and Theory.L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.) - 1970 - Humanities Press.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Dennett's Mind.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):59-72.
Is Dennett a Disillusioned Zimbo?Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):33-57.
Dennett and the Deep Blue Sea.Burton Voorhees - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):53-69.
Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):3-16.
Dennett on the Split-Brain.Roland Puccetti - 1993 - Psycoloquy 4 (52).
Daniel Dennett on the Nature of Consciousness.Susan Schneider - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 313--24.
Living on the Edge.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):135-59.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
111 ( #86,258 of 2,386,868 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #366,616 of 2,386,868 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes