Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):287-310 (1994)
Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories of meaning of Dretske, Fodor, Burge, Putnam, and Kripke on the grounds that each requires that our mental states, unlike those of artifacts, have meaning intrinsically. I argue that we are Unmeant Meaners, incidentally defending Dretske et al., though my goal is to test the explanatory virtue of the intentional stance as applied to the evolution of intentionality
|Keywords||Epistemology Evolution Gene Intentionality Language Dennett, D|
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References found in this work BETA
The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus.Elliott Sober - 1984 - University of Chicago Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press. pp. 504.
Citations of this work BETA
Anticipatory Functions, Digital-Analog Forms and Biosemiotics: Integrating the Tools to Model Information and Normativity in Autonomous Biological Agents.Argyris Arnellos, Luis Emilio Bruni, Charbel Niño El-Hani & John Collier - 2012 - Biosemiotics 5 (3):331-367.
Biological Thinking in Evolutionary Psychology: Rockbottom or Quicksand?H. Looren De Jong & W. J. Van Der Steen - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):183 – 205.
Darwin and Dennett: Still Two Mysteries.Arthur B. Cody - 1996 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (3 & 4):427 – 457.
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