Etyka 52:47-57 (2016)

Gary Foster
Wilfrid Laurier University
In Love as a Moral Emotion David Velleman rejects the conative analysis of love arguing instead for a conception which is modelled after Kantian respect. The general problem associated with conative views of love according to Velleman is that they cut love loose from morality, sometimes characterizing its aims as in conflict with morality.
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DOI 10.14394/etyka.493
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