Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):133-146 (2015)

Zofia Stemplowska
University of Warwick
Political liberalism offers perhaps the most developed and dominant account of justice and legitimacy in the face of disagreement among citizens. A prominent objection states that the view arbitrarily treats differently disagreement about the good, such as on what makes for a good life, and disagreement about justice. In the presence of reasonable disagreement about the good, political liberals argue that the state must be neutral, but they do not suggest a similar response given reasonable disagreement about what justice requires. A leading political liberal, Jonathan Quong, has recently offered a rebuttal to this asymmetry objection. His reply rests on an innovative distinction between justificatory and foundational disagreement. Quong claims that disagreements about justice in a well ordered society are justificatory while disagreements about the good are foundational, and suggests that this fact blocks the asymmetry objection. We assess Quong's solution and argue that it fails to justify legitimate state action on matters of justice but not the good. We conclude that the asymmetry objection continues to undermine political liberalism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/japp.12090
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,290
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Three Cheers for Liberal Modesty.Cécile Laborde - 2020 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 23 (1):119-135.
Publicity.Axel Gosseries - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Civic Equality as a Democratic Basis for Public Reason.Henrik D. Kugelberg - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-23.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy.Jonathan Quong - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (3):301-330.
The Asymmetry Objection to Political Liberalism: Evaluation of a Defence.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2018 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):26-32.
Waldron on Law and Disagreement.Thomas Christiano - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (4):513-543.
Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement.David Estlund - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):111-128.
Disagreement and Legitimacy.Zoltan Miklosi & Andres Moles - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (1):1-8.
Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
Theoretical Disagreement and the Semantic Sting.Dale Smith - 2010 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (4):635-661.
Justice: Metaphysical, After All? [REVIEW]Ryan W. Davis - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):207-222.
Overlapping Consensus: Objectivizing a Subjective Standpoint.Remi Odedoyin - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:323-343.
Epistemic Contextualism Defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.


Added to PP index

Total views
60 ( #191,907 of 2,518,859 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #271,748 of 2,518,859 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes