Lying, risk and accuracy

Analysis 77 (4):726-734 (2017)

Authors
Sam Fox Krauss
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx105
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References found in this work BETA

Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.
The Intentional Stance.Daniel Dennett - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.

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Citations of this work BETA

Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
Lying, Accuracy, and Credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.
Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.

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