Armchair Access and Imagination

Dialectica 72 (4):525-547 (2018)

Authors
Giada Fratantonio
University of Helsinki
Abstract
In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins (2005), and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.
Keywords Imagination  E=K  Evidence  Evidential Externalism  Armchair Access  McKinsey Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12249
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):455-464.
Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg & Stephen J. Crowley - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):177-195.
Reliabilism and Privileged Access.Kourken Michaelian - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-04-05

Total views
71 ( #115,586 of 2,266,270 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #13,906 of 2,266,270 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature