A conscious artifact?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

After discussing various types of consciousness, several approaches to machine consciousness, software agent, and global workspace theory, we describe a software agent, IDA, that is 'conscious' in the sense of implementing that theory of consciousness. IDA perceives, remembers, deliberates, negotiates, and selects actions, sometimes 'consciously'. She uses a variety of mechanisms, each of which is briefly described. It's tempting to think of her as a conscious artifact. Is such a view in any way justified? The remainder of the paper considers this question

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,215

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
16 (#669,370)

6 months
1 (#449,220)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Computationally rational agents can be moral agents.Bongani Andy Mabaso - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):137-145.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references