Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5 (2003)
AbstractAfter discussing various types of consciousness, several approaches to machine consciousness, software agent, and global workspace theory, we describe a software agent, IDA, that is 'conscious' in the sense of implementing that theory of consciousness. IDA perceives, remembers, deliberates, negotiates, and selects actions, sometimes 'consciously'. She uses a variety of mechanisms, each of which is briefly described. It's tempting to think of her as a conscious artifact. Is such a view in any way justified? The remainder of the paper considers this question
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