Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829 (1969)
This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind
|Keywords||Ethics Free Will Moral Responsibility Possibility Frankfurt, H|
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Historical Moral Responsibility: Is The Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?Eric Christian Barnes - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: A Reply to Swenson.Cova Florian - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-20.
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