Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829 (1969)

Authors
Harry G. Frankfurt
Princeton University
Abstract
This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind
Keywords Ethics  Free Will  Moral Responsibility  Possibility  Frankfurt, H
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2023833
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