Contradictory belief and epistemic closure principles

Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226 (1999)
Authors
Bryan Frances
University of Tartu
Abstract
Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then if she considers these two beliefs and Q, then she is in a position to know that..
Keywords Kripke's puzzle  closure  epistemic closure  Frege's puzzle  Millianism  substitutivity
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00110
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Fregean Sense and Anti-Individualism.Daniel Whiting - 2007 - Philosophical Books 48 (3):233-240.

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