Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):577-598 (2017)

Reductionists about agency maintain that an agent’s causing something is reducible to states and events involving the agent causing something. Some worry that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One reductionist answer to this worry, which I call ‘identification reductionism,’ contends that self-governing agents are identified with certain attitudes, and so these attitudes’ causing a decision count as the agent’s self-determining the decision. I argue that a prominent species of identification reductionism developed by Harry Frankfurt, Agnieszka Jaworska, Jeffrey Seidman, and David Shoemaker—according to which an agent is identified with his (deepest) cares—is inadequate.
Keywords free will  moral responsibility  identification  cares  Harry Frankfurt  emotions  causal theory of action  self-determination  reductionism
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12204
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.

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