Synthese 101 (2):249 - 272 (1994)

Abstract
Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented inMorals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of accidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the rationality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be argued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of individuals who are themselves not rational actors but simple rule-followers. A proper analysis of the strategic choice situation involving two rational actors who confront each other shows that constrained maximization as the choice of both actors can only result under very demanding assumptions.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064019
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References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Reason and Maximization.David Gauthier - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):411 - 433.
Cooperation in the Prisoni.J. V. Howard - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (3):203.

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Citations of this work BETA

Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.

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