Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27 (2012)
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Abstract |
In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. It also suggests that, rather than being beliefs that fail to meet the relevant standards of rationality, delusions may be non-doxastic acceptances that were never meant to meet them
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Keywords | Acceptance Belief Delusion Faith Irrationality |
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DOI | 10.1007/s12152-011-9123-7 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
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Citations of this work BETA
If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.
When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.
View all 10 citations / Add more citations
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