Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances

Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27 (2012)

Authors
Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield
Abstract
In Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs , Lisa Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of delusions is no barrier to their being classified as beliefs. This comment asks how Bortolotti’s position may be affected if we accept that there are two distinct types of belief, belonging to different levels of mentality and subject to different ascriptive constraints. It addresses some worries Bortolotti has expressed about the proposed two-level framework and outlines some questions that arise for her if the framework is adopted. It also suggests that, rather than being beliefs that fail to meet the relevant standards of rationality, delusions may be non-doxastic acceptances that were never meant to meet them
Keywords Acceptance  Belief  Delusion  Faith  Irrationality
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DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9123-7
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief’s Minimal Rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.

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