Dual systems and dual attitudes

Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51 (2012)
It can be argued that dual-system theorists should adopt an action - based view of System 2 (S2), on which S2 reasoning is an intentional activity. It can also be argued that they should adopt a dual - attitude theory, on which the two systems have distinct sets of propositional attitudes. However, Peter Carruthers has argued that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which are partially realized in S1 attitudes. This view is compatible with, and a natural extension of, the action-based view.
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DOI 10.1007/s11299-011-0094-5
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References found in this work BETA
A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
A Dual Systems Theory of Incontinent Action.Caleb Dewey - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):925-944.

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