Authors
Robert Francescotti
San Diego State University
Abstract
According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
Keywords Cognitive Psychology  Externalism  Mentalism  Science  Marr, D
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/42.2.227
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