Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57 (2017)

Bryan Frances
United Arab Emirates University
This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, it comments on the significance of the agreement and progress.
Keywords disagreement  metaphilosophy  philosophical progress  expertise  agreement  scientific progress
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12227
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

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