Evolutionary pressures and a stable world for animals and robots: A commentary on Merker ☆

Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):115-118 (2005)
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Abstract

In his article on The Liabilities of Mobility, Merker asserts that “Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions—the world …” and argues for this property as providing evolutionary pressure for the evolution of consciousness. In this commentary, I will explore the implications of Merker’s ideas for consciousness in artificial agents as well as animals, and also meet some possible objections to his evolutionary pressure claim.

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