Evolutionary psychology versus Fodor: Arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis

Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):687 – 710 (2007)
Abstract
Evolutionary psychologists tend to view the mind as a large collection of evolved, functionally specialized mechanisms, or modules. Cosmides and Tooby (1994) have presented four arguments in favor of this model of the mind: the engineering argument, the error argument, the poverty of the stimulus argument, and combinatorial explosion. Fodor (2000) has discussed each of these four arguments and rejected them all. In the present paper, we present and discuss the arguments for and against the massive modularity hypothesis. We conclude that Cosmides and Tooby's arguments have considerable force and are too easily dismissed by Fodor.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080701665904
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The Language Instinct.Steven Pinker - 1995 - Harper Perennial.
Natural Language and Natural Selection.Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):707-27.

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