Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity

Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81 (2005)
Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory
Keywords Death  Fetus  Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology
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DOI 10.1080/1386979042000336144
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Contingent Identity.Allan Gibbard - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

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