Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230 (2011)

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In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails
Keywords Free will  Moral responsibility  Libertarianism  Luck argument   Mind argument  Rollback argument  Robert Kane  Peter van Inwagen
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9583-3
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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The fruitful death of modal collapse arguments.Joseph C. Schmid - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1):3-22.
Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.

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