Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument

Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails
Keywords Free will  Moral responsibility  Libertarianism  Luck argument   Mind argument  Rollback argument  Robert Kane  Peter van Inwagen
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9583-3
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References found in this work BETA
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility.Brian Embry - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:380-398.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.

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