No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists

Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37 (2010)
Abstract
Recently a number of writers have argued that a new form of relativism involves a form of semantic context-dependence which helps it escape the perhaps most common objection to ordinary contextualism; that it cannot accommodate our intuitions about disagreement. I argue: (i) In order to evaluate this claim we have to pay closer attention to the nature of our intuitions about disagreement. (ii) We have different such intuitions concerning different questions: we have more stable disagreement intuitions about moral disputes than about, say, disputes about matters of taste. (iii) The new form of relativism does not vindicate the stable intuitions about disagreement. (iv) It does a better job explaining the unstable intuitions than contextualism. But, pace some relativists, it is not clear that assertion-truth rather than just proposition-truth has to be relativized to accomplish this.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9414-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,798
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
Relative Correctness.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-06-10

Total downloads
207 ( #20,441 of 2,199,777 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #44,378 of 2,199,777 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature